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In the Supreme Court of the Stale of Utah 
DREXI~L B. DICKINSON a minor 
' ' 
hy DELL B. DI1CKINSON, Guardian 
Ad Litem and DELL B. DICKINSON, 
imlividually, 
Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
- vs -
\rILLTAJ\f l\IASON, 1\1.D., 
Def endant-Responrlent. 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
NATURE OF CASE 
Case No. 
10591 
This was an action alleging medical malpractice. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
At the conclusion of plaintiffs' evidence, District 
.Judg-e Ferdinand Erickson, sitting with a jury at Pan-
Rlli kh, lJtah, grantPd defendant's motion to dismiss with 
jll'\'.indice, for insufficient evidencf~ of negligence or 
rnu:-:ation. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Defendant does not accept plaintiffs' abbreviated 
statement of facts because the essential portion of plain-
tiffs' evidence - the testimony of their medical expert 
- is set forth merely in summary of some of the direct 
examination, and the effect of the testimony following 
cross-examination is completely ignored. 
As was pointed out by this 1Court in its affirrnance 
of a dismissal of a negligence action at the end of plain-
tiffs' evidence, it is fundamental that "testimony of a 
witness on his direct examination is no stronger than as 
modified or left by his further examination or by his 
cross-examination. A particular part of his testimony 
may not be singled out through the exclusion of other 
parts of equal importance bearing on the subject." Alva-
rado v. Tucker (1954), 2 Utah 2d lG, 2GS P. 2<l 9SG. 
·with full recognition of the rule that inferencrs 
favorable to plaintiffs must be indulged in this Court's 
review of an involuntary dismissal, the record fairly 
shows the following facts : 
The minor plaintiff, a resident of Salt Lake County, 
sustained a severe laceration from a butcher knife on 
his right index finger ·while on a visit in the Panguitch 
area. The laceration was long, curving and oblique and 
was deep enough to sever the bone in the middle phalanx 
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3 
of' tlH· finger. A1·teries and capillary vessels supplying 
Jilond to the distal one-third of the finger were also sev-
''1w1, as wen~ the nerves and muscle fibers and the flexor 
ancl <>xfrnsor tendons which enable the finger to be flexed 
ur extended ('l'R lG, 17, 71, 72). 
'l'lie child was taken to the Panguitch L.D.S. Hospital 
,,·Jwn• the finger was treated by the defendant, a physi-
cian and surgeon engaged in general practice in Pan-
guitch. He "folded the skin over," according to one lay 
\ritness, and stated he was trying to make a "graft," 
ia the hope the finger could be saved. The injury and 
treahm•nt occuned on August 11, 1959, and the boy re-
tunwd to his home in the Salt Lake City area on August 
13, 1939 (TR. 100). On the evening of August 14, more 
than 7:2 hours after the original injury and treatment, 
the child's mother telephoned Dr. Glenn -Wilson, a general 
practitioner in Salt Lake County, reqnesting medication 
for pain, which the doctor refused to supply until he 
saw the child. He urged the mother to bring the child 
to the office even though it was after G :00 p.m., but the 
1:10th<'r stated she hacl no means to go to the office. The 
doctor thought this was strange inasmuch as his office 
\ra~ only hrn blocb from plaintiffs' residence (TR 
-HI, 33). 
The child was presented to Dr. -Wilson the morning 
o[ August lG, approxima:ely 9G hours after the injury, 
~1!](} lw noted the finger v:ns heavily bandaged and there 
<\pt1( 0ared to be s',n•llinp; at :hp bast> of the fin;~('l' ancl on 
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the dorsum of the hand proximal to the first knuckle. HP 
removed the bandage and determined the finger wa~ 
black, without feeling or sensation, and that it probably 
would require amputation ('11 R. 16, 19). The child wa.s 
hospitalized the following day and amputation was effect-
ed by Dr. Boyd Holbrook, Salt Lake City orthopedic sur-
geon (TR. 51). 
On direct examination Dr. "Wilson expressed the 
opinion that the treatment afforded by the defendant 
was not proper in that the finger was bandaged too 
tightly, which cut off the circulation, and the bandage 
used was not "the same type as a reasonable prud(•nt 
doctor" would apply in treatment of such an injury 
(TR. 24, 34). 
Dr. "Wilson further testified on direct examination 
that when he first saw the finger, there was "no loss in 
the total length of the finger" and that ihe entire length 
of the finger was still present except for the fingernail 
and some "bony tissue" (TR. 34). 
Upon cross-examination he admitted that upon de-
position in 1964, which deposition had been read, cor-
rected and signed under oath by him, and which had been 
taken at a time when his office chart was before him, 
he had testified that the end of the finger, illcluding the 
nail, was intact at the time he first saw the finger, and 
he therefore admitted, upon trial, that he did not know 
which was the correct statement (TR 52). 
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On di rcct examination, Dr. Wilson testified the 
finger "should have been a normal functioning finger 
if it had been properly treated" (TR 42). However, 
upon cross-examination the doctor conceded that he had 
tl•stified upon deposition, and it was still his opinion, 
that "this finger was almost completely amputated by 
the injury and I think any doctor would have felt for-
tunate in getting a normally function finger from this." 
(TR Gl). Upon trial he further conceded that when 
tlwre is but two-thirds of a finger remaining after 
injury, the proLabilities me the remaining portion of 
the finger would have required amputation, and he 
ronceded that his statement upon deposition was still 
trnP. 
"I would have recommended an amputation, 
anyway, because he had two areas of the finger 
that were severed, one at the tip and one at the 
middl<' of the second digit, so that he would have 
had approximately two-thirds of the finger left 
and two-thirds of the right index finger get in 
the 1yay." (TR. 63). 
Dr. ·Wilson was firm in his opinion that the gan-
grene in this case occurred because the bandage was too 
tight. In this connection he also contended, at one point 
in liis testimon>·, that the finger would not swell im;ide 
th(• bandage (TR. 68). 
Fio\\·eyer, this poi·tion of his tesfonony was in con-
flict with his other testi1;10;:y that the amount of swelling 
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depends "on the amount of soft tissue in the injury. I 
Some of these injuries swell a lot and some of them swell 
a little" (TR. 37). Concerning the treatment which an 
injury of this severity would require, the witness con-
ceded that whether the remaining portion of the finger 
should be immediately amputated, or an attempt be made 
to save the finger, depended upon "the clinical know- 1 
ledge" of the attending physician, and then he testified: ' 
"Q. And so when you say clinical knowledge of the 
doctor, does this mean the sum total of what 
he's learned and what his judgment is from 
treating other patients? 
A. That's right. The age of the patient, the pre-
sence of absence of infection, and the amount 
of sluffing of the tissues would influence your 1 
decision in this. 
Q. This would be a decision that the doctor makes 
using these faculties of judgment based upon 
what he sees before him at that time? 
A. That is correct. 
Q. And you would agree, would you not, doctor, 
that the judgment of one doctor might differ 
in that respect from the judgment of another 
doctor? 
A. Undoubtedly." (TR. 73, 74). 
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'l'he witness conceded that, speaking generally, three 
doetors of approximate equal training and knowledge in 
the field might all arrive at a different conclusion from 
each other and then, with reference to this specific in-
jnry, he testified: 
"Q. . . . So then getting back to this finger, the 
question before the doctor at the time of this 
treatment, from the time of seeing the original 
injury required exercise of clinical judgment 
based upon his experience for one, right? 
A. Right. 
Q. And a determination by him as to whether or 
not in his judgment the circulation of the fing-
er would be or had been sufficiently impai:red 
that it would be impossible to save the tip of it, 
that's 'dmt he had to consider? 
A. That's right. 
Q. And that is a matter that you wight differ with 
any doctor - right? 
A. That's right." (TR. 75). 
At the conclusion of the cross-examination of Dr. 
Wilson, the trial court asked whether or not there would 
haye been any difference in the hand "as we now find it" 
il' the hoy had gone to a surgeon for immediate treatment, 
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8 
and although the transcript is somewhat garbled at this 
point, the answer of the witnPss was clear: 
"The end result would have been identical." 
(TR. 79). 
Defendant's motion for involuntary dismissal was 
based, and was granted by the court, upon the contention 
that expert testimony was rel1uired to establish the stan-
dard of care, the claimed deviation from the standard, 
and the effect of the alleged negligence upon the end 
result, and that in each of these areas of evidence, the 
evidence given by Dr. "Wilson on cross-examination 
either refuted, contradicted or explained the principal 
evidence he had given upon direct examination con-
cerning liability or had merely produced a choice of 
probabilities and that the cumulative effect of his testi-
mony, viewed as a whole, was that neither the deviation 
from the standard of care nor the causal connection 
had been established by expert testimony (TR. 122 to 
126). 
ARGUMENT 
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY GRANTED DE-
FENDANT'S MOTION FOR INVOLUNTARY DIS-
MISSAL BECAUSE THE EVIDENCE WAS INSUF-
FICIENT TO ESTABLISH EITHER NEGLIGENCE 
OR PROXIMATE CAUSE. 
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The injury in this case involved not only an ex-
tensive laceration of the skin and underlying tissues, 
but also severance of the bone, finger arteries and ca-
pillaries, nerves and tendons. There can be no doubt 
that the determination of the proper medical care to 
be afforded such an injury depends upon scientific 
knowledge and is beyond the scope of the knowledge of 
lay persons. In such cases, plaintiff has the burden of 
Pstahlishing, by expert medical testimony, not only the 
otandard of care, but the claimed deviation from that 
standard. Huggins v. Hicken, 6 Utah 2d 233, 310 P. 2d 
523; Mnrsh v. Pem}J('rton, 10 Utah 2d 40, 347 P. 2d 1108. 
In the present case, the only testimony admitted 
on the standard of care was that of Dr. Wilson, who 
stated his opinion that the proper care to be given an 
injury of this kind was to immobilize it and to bandage 
the finger loosely, and that the bandage he removed 
was not "the same type" that a reasonably prudent 
doctor would have used. 
However, on cross-examination, he conceded he had 
not seen the original injury and that the method of treat-
ment a physician might use would necessarily depend 
upon his clinical judgment applied to the injury as he 
Baw it. In his opinion, the bandage had been applied too 
tightly, but that opinion was based upon what he saw 96 
hours after the original treatment. 
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Further upon cross-examination, he refused to con-
cede that the finger might swell beneath a bandage, after 
application, so that the act of swelling would have made 
the bandage too tight, but this testimony was in direc! 
contradiction to that given earlier when he stated that 
the amount of swelling depends "on the amount of soft 
tissue in the injury. Some of these injuries swell a lot 
and some of them swell a little" (TR. 37). No fact was 
presented from which he could determine the exact 
nature of the original injury or the exad treatment that 
was afforded by the defendant. 
Thus the situation is analagous to that which was 
before this 1Court in Marsh v. Pemberton, prl'viously 
cited. In that case the contention was made that the 
defendant surgeon had been negligent in applying, too 
tightly, the underlying padding and a cast following a 
surgical procedure. On that phase of the case, this Court 
stated: 
"Evidence was introduced to the effect that the 
swelling accompanying such an operation could 
be different with every individual; therefore the 
tightness of the cast and the amount of padding 
necessary is a matter of judgment exercised hy 
the physician. A physician is generally liabl~ for 
misjudgment only ·when he arrived at such Judg-
ment through failure to use ordinary care and 
skill or was guilty of misattention or neglect." 
The case at bar is, of course, not identical "''.th 
Marsh v. Pemberton, particularly because that case Ill-
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volvrd continuing treatment and attention by the surgeon 
following the operation, whereas in this case, the de-
fendant was admini::;tering only the original treatment 
in view of the fact that the minor plaintiff shortly in-
kndPd to return to his home in Salt Lake City. Never-
theless, the principles involved are analagous and plain-
tiffs' entire case here is grounded upon a result seen by 
Dr. \Vilson rather than upon a judgment and opinion 
on the propriety of the defendant's actual treatment of 
this injured finger. 
Although the defendant 'vas in court, and could have 
heen called to establish exactly what problems he faced 
with the injury and the procedures he followed to solve 
them, as was done in 111 arsh v. Pemberton, he was not 
asked to tPstify, and thus the only evidence of what he 
actually did, and the problems with which he was faced 
and on which his judgment was brought to bear, came 
from testimony from plaintiff Dell Dickinson, who re-
ported that the defendant told him he had attempted to 
handage the finger so that a graft would take and that 
tlw finger could be saved (TR. 10±). 
No evidence was offered that this procedure con-
stituted a deviation from the standard of care or that 
thr defendant arrived as such a judgment through lack 
of ordinary care and skill or through misattention or 
neglect. 
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If, as stated by Dr. ~Wilson, "some of these injurie~ 
swell a lot and some of them swell a little," then the fact 
that the finger was tight against the bandage, when Dr. 
Wilson saw the finger more than 96 hours later, and 
that the circulation had thus been cut off, does not 
establish that the original application of the bandage 
was too tight. Of further significance was the fact that 
the doctor admitted that when a bandage is placed too 
tightly upon a finger, gangrene begins almost at on('e, 
and pain would soon become apparent. In such event, 
the doctor agreed that in this case the pain would have 
been apparent by the morning of August 13 and at that 
time the pain would be "fairly St'vere pain" and of a 
kind that would require attention (TR. 83). 
However, as appeared without contradiction from 
the testimony of the minor plaintiff and his parents, 
there was no pain on the morning of the 13th, at which 
time, defendant briefly saw the boy before he began the 
trip to Salt Lake City. At that time, defondant evidenced 
his interest and concern for the boy by stating, as quoted 
by the boy's grandmother, that he "sure would have , 
't" I liked to have undone (the bandage) and looked at i, 
but he did not want to disturb it (TR. 120). Obviously 
nothing then appearc~d to the defendant to be wrong 
and nothing was related to him by the patient or th1• 
family indicating the presence of the trouble which Dr. 
\Vilson described as the aftermath of the application 
of an excessively tight bandage on a finger. 
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Tlwre was no evidence that Dr. Mason's apparent 
jndgrnent to leave the bandage undisturbed was wrong 
or tliat the standard of ca1·e required him to do other 
than lw did, under the c:ircumstances with which he 
was faced. 
From the portions of testimony und the state of 
proof set forth in the preceding three paragraphs, it 
is clear that, on the critical issue of negligence, two 
probahilities arose from l)laintiffs' proof: either the 
handag0 was applied too tightly in the first instance or, 
since some oi' thE•se injuric's "swell a lot," the finger 
hegan to ~well bc'neath th'.' bandage and thus the ban-
clngt' heeame too tight. 
l-ncler such circmnstances, to submit this issue to 
the ,jnr)' would be to permit the jury to engage in a form 
of specdation, "'hich is not permitted by the decisions 
of this Court. Marsh v. Pemberton, supra; Forrest v. 
Eason, 123 Ut. GlO, 2Gl P. 2d 178, and cases therein 
cited. 
Although plaintiffs stoutly insist in their hrief that 
tlwy do not concede that the amputation of the finger 
would have been inevitable, because of the extent of the 
original injury, the evidence they presented overwhelm-
ingly Pstabfo;hes that the amputation \\·ould have b?en 
rrquin•d. On dirPct e}:arnination, Dr. -Wilson testified 
the fino-c'r could have been sm·ed and could have been 
/:) 
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functional but, as will be apparent from a reading of 
the entire record, Dr. -Wilson was not prepar<>cl for ksti-
mony in this case and he was forced to concede, botlt to 
the defendant's counsel and to a question from the court 
' that the amputation ·would have been required hecanse 
only two-thirds of the finger actually was left after 
the original injury, and two-thirds of an index finger 
is considered by the medical profession to be insufficient 
m length for functional purposes. 
The basic damage issue in the case revolved around 
the loss of the index finger, but since plaintiffs' mm 
proof established that the finger ·would have been lost 
in any event, there was a failure of proof estahlishing 
a causal connection between any misconduct of the de-
fendant and the ultimate result. 
Therefore, even if plaintiffs' proof had established 
defendant's negligence, there vrns no competent and 
acceptable proof of causation. Under such circumstances, 
plaintiffs are confronted with the principles set forth 
in Andrrson v. Nixon, 104 Pt. 2(i2, 139 P. 2d 2Hi. 
In that case, which involved the alleged failure to 
give blood transfusions in treatment of ostromyelitis, 
this Court stated: 
"As to blood transfusions, one expert <lid 
testify that it was beneficial in blood stream m-
fections, hut did not testify that had there been 
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transfusions the end result might have been 
avoided. Osteomyelitis being a disease the cause 
and cure of ·which is peculiarly within the know-
ledge of medical men and not a matter of com-
mon knowledge, it is necessary to have expert 
kstimony on the effect of the negligence of a doc-
tor on the end result. In this case there was no 
evidence that anything Dr. Nixon did or failed to 
do after osteomyelitis developed caused the end 
result. In the absence of such expert testimony 
then~ is nothing on which a jury can base its find-
ing on the proximate cause of the injury. A jury 
may not conjecture or speculate, but must have 
substantial evidence upon which to base a verdict." 
In this Court, plaintiffs contend that regardless of 
whether the finger would have required amputation in 
anr event, they were entitled to go to the jury on the 
question of the pain suffered by the boy as a result of 
the gangrene, and also upon the question of recovery 
of Dr. Wilson's bill for $20 which bill, they claim, would 
not have lwen incurred except for defendant's conduct. 
The difficulty with that position is, as has already 
lH•en pointed out, contradictions arose from their own 
f!YidencP on the basic issue of whether or not the bandage 
1ras apvliPcl too tightly in the first place or whether it 
lat(•r lweame tight as the result of swelling. Since no 
("Yidence \\Tas produced concerning exactly what Dr . .l\fa-
~on saw and did, and since the jury would therefore 
liaYe lwen required to speculate as to which of the 
prnhahilities occurT<0 cl, and sinc>e gangrene results ,v}1en 
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circulation is restricted, the jury would have been re-
quired to select from thc same two probabilities to 
determine whether anything the defendant did or failed 
to do caused the gangrene. 
Under this state of proof, plaintiffs were not en-
titled to go to the jury on either of the damage issues 
claimed in their brief. 
CONCLUSION 
Plaintiffs' entire case stands or falls upon the testi-
mony of Dr. Wilson. As is apparent from the transcript 
of testimony, he testified in court without benefit of 
his notes or chart, which he stated he had not been 
asked to bring. He was testifying strictly from memory, 
and almost as soon as his cross-examination began, he 
was forced to make the first of a series of changes, cor-
rections and explanations of his direct testimony when i 
he was shown contradicteory t<•stimony from his de-
position or from the hospital chart itself (Exhibit 1). 
Further, the lay witnesses who testified were rx- 1 
eluded from the courtroom during the testimony of 
other witnesses, and as will he shown from the tran-
script of their testimony, there was little agreement 
among them. 
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In view of the entire record, the jury would have 
been required to speculate on the basic issues of negli-
gence and causation and would have had extreme dif-
ficulty in selecting which of the probabilities arising from 
plaintiffs' proof they should adopt. 
The burden of proof was upon pL1intiffs to prove 
their cause of action. As was stated in Alvarado v. 
Tucker, s11pr.a, a finding of negligence 
" ... could not be based on mere speculation 
or conjecture, ... this means ... such degree of 
proof that the greater probability of truth lies 
therein. A choice of probabilities does not meet 
this requirement. It creates only a basis for con-
jecture, on which a verdict of the jury cannot 
stand." 
Upon that state of the record, the judgment of the 
trial court was clearly correct and it should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
JOHN H. SNOW and SKEEN, 
WORSLEY, SNOW & 
CHRISTENSEN 
Attorneys for Defendant-
Respondent 
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